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Abstract 
The Niger Delta conflict has come into global limelight for some time. The peoples have 
been agitated over the sordid acts of ecocide by the oil multinationals, resulting from oil 
explorations without expected economic vantages and physical development in turn. The 
recent occurrences of militia formations, their attacks of oil installations and kidnap of 
expatriates working in the oil wells, have added an interesting but dangerous twist to the 
crisis in the region. This paper curiously questions the failure of government to tackle the 
environmental issues that have culminated in the dangerous twist of nationalism, and 
counts the economic costs of this on Nigeria. The major recommendations in this study 
include- the consideration of people-based interests in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy, and the shifting of presidential power to the oil-producing states, which have 
never produced Nigeria’s president.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The Niger Delta crisis has, in very recent times, taken a much more dangerous 
dimension, underscoring the degeneration of the issue due to the failure of governments 
at all levels and other non-state actors, including the multinational companies (MNCs), to 
bring the crisis to an end. The emergence of militia and cult groups among the 
communities in the last three years points to the aggravation and deterioration, rather than 
resolution of the conflicts. Government’s seeming complicity and protection of the 
MNCs, using instruments of state force to protect the foreign companies, has multiplied 
illegal means and instruments to fight the cause of “economic and social emancipation”, 
as some militants claimed in February 2007 in an interview by Jeff Koniange of the 
American Cable News Network(CNN). This study examines the protracted Niger Delta 
crisis, exacerbated by oil, ecological and socio-ethnic factors, and its implication for 
Nigeria’s external relations. It does this by revisiting the many unresolved issues, 
including the Ogoni crisis, which explain the escalation of the crisis. 
 
While social and relative deprivation is considered primary and environmental issues are 
looked at as the secondary causes of the problem in some studies (in some, it is reduced 
to political and some ethnic or communal), the impact of the Niger Delta problem on 
Nigeria’s relationship with the international community is the only consideration in some 
others; efforts to situate the environmental issues in the eventual world attention are 
infinitesimal and insignificant, or almost non-existent. This paper attempts to correct that 
by re-examining the activities of the oil companies which have created enormous 
ecological problems in the region, in addition to the abjection of the people, thereby 
leading to internal strife.  
 
This study therefore considers the role of environmental issues in the Niger Delta crisis. 
The link between the environmental issues and conflict in the Niger Delta is established, 
while the role of government in the crisis, its protection of the Multinational Oil 
Companies at the expense of its own people, and elimination of environmental activists 
including Ken Saro-Wiwa in mid 1990s, are discussed. However, the emergence of 
vicious militant groups, such as the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and their many incursions 
on the economic and resource base of the region which constitute a setback to Nigeria’s 
economic development, coupled with the huge environmental crisis in the region, 
 3 
represent the economic cost of the phenomenon and also explain the international 
dimension of the crisis. 
 
2.0 Backgrounds to the Niger Delta Crisis 
The Niger Delta region covers an estimated area of 20,000 km2 within wetlands of 70,000 
km2 formed primarily by sediment deposition. It is located on the south-south 
geographical region of Nigeria and has a population of about 20 million people made up 
of many ethnic nationalities. The region comprise nine states which include; Abia, Akwa-
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. However, the core Niger 
Delta region include the three states of   Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. The vegetation of the 
Nigerian coastal area is characterized by mangrove forests, brackish swamp forests and 
rain forests. The country’s extensive mangrove ecosystem, a great proportion of which 
lies within the Niger Delta and found mainly in the Rivers, Delta, Cross River, Akwa 
lbom, Lagos and Ondo states, is estimated to cover between 500,000 and 885,000 
hectares. Freshwaters start at the northern limit of the mangrove ecosystems and extend 
to the Sahelian region (Kuruk, 2004). The Delta environment is made up of four major 
ecological zones which include: mangrove swamp forests, fresh water swamps, coaster 
barrier islands, and lowland rainforests. Thus, the well-endowed ecosystem of the Delta 
is simply incredible as it naturally, can sustain more species of fresh water fish, economic 
trees, and a wide variety of crops than any other ecosystem in West Africa.  
 
In 1956, Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) discovered crude oil at 
Oloibiri, a village in the Niger Delta, and commercial production began in 1958. Today, 
there are 606 oil fields in the Niger Delta, of which 360 are on-shore and 246 off-shore 
(Nigeria Country Analysis Brief, 2005). Nigeria is now the largest oil producer in Africa 
and the sixth largest in the world, averaging 2.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2006. 
Nigeria’s economy is heavily dependent on earnings from the oil sector, which provides 
20% of GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues 
(CIA World Fact Book, 2005) cited in (Nwilo and Badejo, 2006).  
 
The Niger Delta Crisis is unarguably related to environmental problems in the area which 
surprisingly is closely linked to the activities of its oil industry.  It is ironic that while the 
region holds some of the world’s richest and finest deposits of crude oil, the people living 
in the area are poorer than ever. While oil companies including Shell, ExxonMobil and 
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TotalFinaElf, have profited from over forty five years of oil exploration in the region,  
local communities in the oil rich but conflict-ridden areas live with the daily pollution 
caused by non-stop gas flaring – where the gas associated with oil extraction is burnt off 
into the atmosphere. More gas is flared in Nigeria than anywhere else in the world – in 
Western Europe 99 per cent of associated gas is used or re-injected into the ground. But 
in Nigeria, despite regulations introduced more than 20 years ago to outlaw the practice, 
most associated gas is flared, causing local pollution and contributing to climate change.  
 
Besides, the problem of oil spills, deliberate destruction of the mangrove to pave way for 
pipelines, disappearance of the aqua-life again due to oil spills and frequent movements 
of heavy ships, etc are common occurrences in the Niger Delta. With the rate of 
degradation, the region could suffer a loss of some very significant percentage of its 
inhabitable terrain in the foreseeable future if nothing urgent is done to salvage the ugly 
situation. In fact, the experiences of the people of this region over the years can 
accurately be described as the tragedy of exploitation.  
 
Niger Delta communities had expressed discontent and ventilated their grievances 
through political and constitutional means against the marginalization and environmental 
abuses of their soils and waters from independence (The News, 2006). In more recent 
times, particularly from the 1990s, they had become more restive and violent in their 
protests against the activities of foreign oil companies, notably Royal-Dutch Shell (Shell 
Petroleum Development Company). Their grievances have focused on the deteriorating 
conditions of life brought about by air and water pollution, land degradation and the 
socioeconomic impacts of oil exploration on the local communities. The 1990s witnessed 
the outburst of violence against transnational oil corporations and seeming government’s 
conspiracy with them, and the use of one ethnic group against another or infiltration by 
TNCs/government of ethnic groups with black-sheep, which bred grave intra and inter 
ethnic hostilities (Agbese, 2002).  
 
Government’s complicity in the crisis found manifestation in the deployment of heavily 
armed military personnel to guard oil facilities, operations and expatriates and the MNCs 
(Ikpatt, 2001). In addition, oil companies have had to recruit jobless local youths to watch 
over oil interests, thus setting local people against themselves. The official reason given 
however was that the presence of heavy security would act as deterrence to aggressive 
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communities from destroying oil installations. The rationale behind this was controversial 
as it also showed insensitivity to the fundamental causation of persistent conflict, namely 
abjection and denials.  
 
3.0 Impact of Oil Industry on the Environment in the Niger Delta 
Some of the major environmental concerns of the negative exploratory activities of oil 
companies in the Niger Delta include oil spillage and gas flaring in the area. The net 
effects of these shortcomings have expectedly made life extremely difficult in the region. 
Nwilo and Badejo, (2006) in support of the foregoing pointed out that “since the 
discovery of oil in Nigeria in the 1950s, the country has been suffering the negative 
environmental consequences of oil development. The growth of the country's oil 
industry,  combined  with  a  population  explosion  and  a  lack  of  enforcement  of 
environmental  regulations  has  led  to  substantial  damage  to  Nigeria's  environment, 
especially in the Niger Delta region.”  Akpofure et al, (2000) cited in Nwilo and Badejo, 
(2006), clarifies that “when there is an oil spill on water, spreading immediately takes 
place. The gaseous and liquid components evaporate. Some get dissolved in water and 
even oxidize, and yet some undergo bacterial changes and eventually sink to the bottom 
by gravitational action. The soil is then contaminated with a gross effect upon the 
terrestrial life. As the evaporation of the volatile lower molecular weight components 
affects aerial life, so the dissolution of the less volatile components with the resulting 
emulsified water, affects aquatic life.”  
Other studies have also shown that oil on water surface also interferes with gaseous 
interchange at the sea surface and dissolved oxygen levels will thereby be lowered. This 
will no doubt reduce the life span of marine animals. Micro-organisms also degrade 
petroleum hydrocarbons after spillage (Atlas, 1981; Leahy and Colwell, 1990; Atlas and 
Bartha, 1992). Oil spill incidents have occurred in various parts and at different times 
along the country’s coast. Some major spills in the coastal zone are the GOCON’s 
Escravos spill in 1978 of about 300,000 barrels, SPDC’s Forcados Terminal tank failure 
in 1978 of about 580,000 barrels and Texaco Funiwa-5 blow out in 1980 of about 
400,000 barrels. Other oil spill incidents are those of the Abudu pipe line in 1982 of 
about 18,818 barrels, The Jesse Fire Incident which claimed about a thousand lives and 
the Idoho Oil Spill of January 1998, of about 40,000 barrels. The most publicized of all 
oil spills in Nigeria occurred on January 17, 1980 when a total of 37.0 million litres of 
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crude oil got spilled into the environment. This spill occurred as a result of a blow out at 
Funiwa 5 offshore station. Nigeria's largest spill was an offshore well-blow out in January 
1980 when an estimated 200,000 barrels of oil (8.4million US gallons) spilled into the 
Atlantic Ocean from an oil industry facility and that damaged 340 hectares of mangrove 
(Nwilo and Badejo, 2005).  Table 1.0 below provides a summary of oil spill incidences in 
Nigeria between the period 1976 and 1998. These figures are official figures which in most 
cases may not adequately report all cases of oil spillage.  
Table 1.0: Oil Spill Data for Nigeria 
S/NO Year Number of Spill 
Incidents   
Quantity spilled 
(barrels) 
1 1976 128 26,157.00 
2 1977 104 32,879.25 
3 1978 154 489,294.75 
4 1979 157 694,117.13 
5 1980 241 600,511.02 
6 1981 238 42,722.50 
7 1982 257 42,841.00 
8 1983 173 48,351.30 
9 1984 151 40,209.00 
10 1985 187 11,876.60 
11 1986 155 12,905.00 
12 1987 129 31,866.00 
13 1988 208 9,172.00 
14 1989 195 7,628.161 
15 1990 160 14,940.816 
16 1991 201 106,827.98 
17 1992 367 51,131.91 
18 1993 428 9,752.22 
19 1994 515 30,282.67 
20 1995 417 63,677.17 
21 1996 430 46,353.12 
22 1997 339 59,272.30 
23 1998 390 98345.00 
  Total 5724 2,571,113.90 
Source: The Department of Petroleum Resources, cited in Nwilo and Badejo (2001) 
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It is important to note here that spilled oil is most of the time lost to the environment. For 
example,  Nwilo and Badejo, (2006) pointed out that “Available records for the period of 
1976 to 1996 indicate that approximately 6%, 25%, and 69% respectively, of total oil 
spilled in the Niger Delta area, were in land, swamp and offshore environments. Also, 
between 1997 and 2001, Nigeria recorded a total number of 2,097 oil spill incidents.” The 
other major negative consequence of oil exploration and exploitation is the incidents of 
gas flaring. This is a practice whereby the associated gas accompanying the production of 
crude oil is burnt off so as to maximize the production of crude oil. However, the 
prevailing consensus worldwide regarding gas flaring is that it is wasteful economically 
and environmentally. The burning of gas by flaring leads to the emission of carbon 
dioxide, the main greenhouse gas.  
Venting of the gas without burning, a practice for which flaring seems often to be treated 
as a synonym, releases methane, the second main greenhouse gas. It is therefore very 
disturbing to note that associated gas flaring continues unabated in Nigeria. For instance, 
a report by Friends of the Earth (2005) shows that, “More gas is flared in Nigeria than 
anywhere else in the world. Estimates are notoriously unreliable, but roughly 2.5 billion 
cubic feet of gas associated with crude oil is wasted in this way everyday. This is equal to 
40% of all Africa's natural gas consumption in 2001. The same report further disclosed 
that “The flaring of associated gas (AG) in the Niger Delta is a human rights, 
environmental and economic monstrosity. Nowhere else in the world have communities 
been subjected to it on such a scale. It is estimated to cost Nigeria US $2.5 billion 
annually, whilst the roaring, toxic flares affect the health and livelihoods of Delta 
inhabitants.”  
In terms of how much is flared, the Friends of the Earth (2005) report estimated that “For 
the first 20 years or so of the industry, almost all the AG was flared: 2.1 billion cubic feet 
per day (bcf/d) or 92% in 1981 for example. This percentage barely declined during the 
1980s, standing at about 88% in 1989. It seems to have reached about 2.6 bcf/d in the late 
1990s, including venting, though by then this was about 75% of all gas production. 
Whilst OPEC has suggested that flaring has since dropped below 2 bcf/d, and whilst both 
OPEC and the Nigerian Department of Petroleum Resources have suggested that gas 
flared as a percentage of all gas production has dropped below 50%, this is not 
universally accepted.” Whatever is the situation, the figures are still alarming particularly 
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when a comparative analysis of the situation is undertaken. The table below provides a 
summary of estimated volume of flared gas in some selected countries. 
Table 2.0: Best Estimate of Gas-Flaring Trends in Selected Countries (2000) 
Country  Flared Gas       Share of  World          Ratio of Gas Flared to Total Produced  
                              total (%)                          1990                           2000   
Algeria 
Angola 
China 
Egypt 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Nigeria 
Mexico 
North sea* 
Russia 
Venezuela 
United states 
Other countries 
         6.8                6                              79                        101  
         4.3                4                              n/a**                   118 
         3.2                3                              n/a**                     74 
         0.9                1                              37                          23 
         4.5                4                              66                          66 
       10.5               10                             70                          56 
       17.2               16                           250                        166 
         5.6                 5                             n/a                         33 
         2.7                 3                             18                            9 
       11.5                11                            n/a                         77 
         4.5                  4                             30                         27 
         2.8                  3                             10                         22 
        33.0               30                              -                            -                                     
World        107.5             100                             -                            - 
Source: Cedigaz, USEIA, OPEC, IEA, World Bank, HIS Energy Group 
*North Sea-Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom.  
                    Germany and Netherlands do not flare gas, (Cedigaz, 2000)  
**n/a- Not available 
A careful consideration of the above table shows that Nigeria comes out as the world's 
number one flarer and Venter on both absolute and proportionate bases whether based on 
OPEC figures for Nigeria for 2001 which is 16.8 bcm/y, or on Cedigaz data, in which 
case, Nigeria accounted for 19.79% of the global amount estimated to be a total world 
flaring volume of 84.87 bcm, in 2001. This amount surprisingly is more than those of the 
second and third countries combined, and four times higher than the nearest African 
country, Algeria, which is recorded as having flared and vented 4 bcm. European flaring 
is put at 2.54 bcm, or 0.76% of gross production; US flaring at 2.97 bcm, or 0.43% of 
gross production, while world total gross production in 2001 was 3150.13 bcm, with 
84.87 bcm or 2.69% flared and vented. 
Gas flaring contributes significantly to climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, IPCC (2001) in its report stated that “the global average surface 
temperature increased by about 0.6°C over the 20th century, that it was 66-90% confident 
that most of the observed warming over the second half of the century was due to the 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations, and projected that the temperature would 
increase from 1990-2100 by 1.4 to 5.8°C. It also stated that global mean sea level is 
 9 
projected to rise by 0.09 to 0.88 metres between 1990 and 2100, due primarily to thermal 
expansion and loss of mass from glaciers and ice caps.” This has serious implication for 
northern Nigeria where the problem of desertification has become very disturbing.  
According to UNEP (1997), “Desertification in Africa has already reduced by 25% the 
potential vegetative productivity of more than 7 million km2, or one-quarter of the 
continent's land area. It will lead to more people being unable to live in the countryside 
and to an increase pressure on urban areas.” Flaring in Nigeria is widely believed to have 
contributed more emissions of greenhouse gases than all other sources in sub- Saharan 
Africa combined. The World Bank ( 2002) sums up the scale of Nigerian flaring as 
follows; "The most striking example of environmental neglect has been in the oil sector, 
where natural gas flaring has contributed more emissions of greenhouse gases than all 
other sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined.” 
Within the Niger Delta, there is a common but firm belief that gas flaring is damaging the 
health of the local people. This stems from the fact that flaring of AG from oil production 
facilities is like setting a match to a large container of petrol. The enormous heat they 
emit simply would not permit any life (plant and animal) around them to survive. 
Exposure to these pollutants impact human health adversely. According to the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA): "Many scientific studies have 
linked breathing particulate matter to a series of significant health problems, including: 
aggravated asthma, increases in respiratory symptoms like coughing and difficult or 
painful breathing, chronic bronchitis, decreased lung function, and premature death." 
Also, according to the U.S. EPA: "It has been clearly established and accepted that 
exposure to benzene and its metabolites causes acute nonlymphocytic leukemia and a 
variety of other blood-related disorders in humans." (Cited in; Friends of the Earth, 
2005). Gas Flaring is thus considered to be a likely cause of premature deaths and cases 
of leukemia in the Niger Delta. 
One other well established health damaging consequence of gas flaring includes high 
incidences of acid rain which the Delta residents have long complained about particularly 
how their corrugated roofs have been corroded by the composition of the rain that falls as 
a result of flaring. The primary causes of acid rain are emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which combine with atmospheric moisture to form sulfuric 
acid and nitric acid, respectively. Acid rain acidifies lakes and streams and damages 
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vegetation. In addition, acid rain accelerates the decay of building materials and paints. 
Prior to falling to the earth, SO2 and NOx gases and their particulate matter derivatives, 
sulfates and nitrates, contribute to visibility degradation and harm public health. In the 
Delta, an oily hue is often observed on collected rain water, (Friends of the Earth, 2005) 
The report further added that the observation that gas flaring in the Niger Delta is causing 
acid rain is also backed by the U.S government's Energy Information Administration, 
which states: "The continued process of gas flaring has not only meant that a potential 
energy source - and source of revenue - has gone up in smoke, but it is also a major 
contributor to air pollution and acid rain.”  
4.0 Niger Delta Conflicts, Global Response and Nigeria’s External Relations  
By 1970, about 300,000 barrels of crude oil had been spilled in the Niger Delta area 
(Earth Action, 1994). According to Shell, the spillage was an act of sabotage by the 
Biafran army as they were losing to in the civil war (Shell, 1995). Shell figures also show 
that from 1985 to early 1993, 5,352 barrels of oil were spilled in 87 incidents in 
Ogoniland after their staff had been withdrawn. The tendency had been for state officials 
and oil companies to blame the problems on sabotage by local communities. For instance, 
Shell claimed that out of 87 instances of oil spillage in Ogoniland between 1985 and 
1993, 60 (about 70%) were sabotage acts. The figure tallied with government claims that 
out of 11 incidents in Ogoniland in 1990, that eight or 73% were due to sabotage (cited in 
Okerenta, 2006). 
 
Damages to the environment in Ogoniland went along with deprivation. Consequently, 
local leaders protested these injustices. The regime of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) reduced public spending, subsidies to goods such as petrol, which led 
to the rise of pump price of petroleum products from N 0.75/litre in 1986 to N 11/litre in 
1996. These severely affected standards of living and hardship everywhere, which were 
more pronounced in the oil-producing areas.. Evidence of conflicts began to show before 
1980, but the situation worsened in the second half of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
However, because oil exploration by multi-national oil corporations had increased with 
the expanding space of squalor the Niger Delta people began to hold oil companies and 
the government responsible for their deprivation. They lamented, for instance the failure 
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of the two institutions to construct new or at least rehabilitate existing roads, schools, 
hospitals, and provide opportunities for employment, support for farming, and indeed do 
everything to improve their livelihood. Oil companies and government insisted that these 
claims were exaggerated as they were sometimes outrageous and indecorously demanded 
(Rowell and Kretzmann, 1999). In response, Shell, government and seven other 
neighboring oil-producing communities like Asa-Ndoki, dismissed these claims (Shell, 
1995); (Daily Champion, 1994); (The News, 1995). However, it was relative deprivation, 
the gap between expectation and actualization, like the one in the foregoing claims that 
explain why men rebel (Gurr, 1974), and more importantly, that explicates the Niger 
Delta conflicts.     
 
Osaghae (1995) argues that the approach of minorities in their demand for better living 
hitherto were passive, namely by delegation and petitions to the state and oil firms. The 
failure of these means to engender meaningful changes may explain why the Ogonis 
decided on a different line of action in the early 1990s. Precisely in 1990, a non political 
organization comprising Ogoni elite and traditional rulers, known as KAGOTE whose 
origin dates back to the 1970s, drew up and presented to the state, the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights. Among other things earlier highlighted, they demanded political autonomy within 
Nigeria and a fair access to and use of oil revenue derived from Ogoniland to develop 
their homeland and language, as well as protection from Shell. As an instrument to 
pursue the actualization of the demands in the Bill of Rights, the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was set up in 1990.  
 
MOSOP followed the Bill of Rights up with intense campaigns at both the national and 
international levels with a view to publicizing the Ogoni predicament. In that effort, the 
Bill was presented to the United Nations Sub-Committee on Human Rights on the 
Prevention from Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the African Human Rights 
and several other non-state actors such as the General Assembly of the Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples’ Organization at the Hague in 1993 (Okonta, 2000). Government 
and Shell initially responded to the Bill with indifference. However, as MOSOP began to 
secure public and international support, the state reacted by banning ethnic organizations 
and others such as MOSOP and the Ethnic Minority Rights Organization of Africa 
(EMIROAF), both led by Saro-Wiwa. These two organizations and the National Youth 
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Council of Ogoni People were the three main organizations, which spearheaded the 
Ogoni insurrection. 
 
Attaching it to the Bill of Rights, MOSOP wrote to Shell, Chevron and the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in December 1992, asking for a favourable 
disposition to Ogoni demands or evacuation from the land. Other demands included the  
payment of $6 billion in accumulated rents and royalties for oil exploited in Ogoni fields 
from 1958; reparation of $4 billion for soil, water, and air pollution; cessation of gas 
flaring; and commencement of negotiation with Ogoni people. According to 
Osaghae(1995) the significance of the letter to the companies was that it showed the 
people’s loss of confidence in the state. According to them, it was time for ‘the Ogoni to 
fight for their own salvation because there is no government to deliver us.”(ibid). 
 
It is pertinent to note that in contemporary global politics, human rights and the 
environment are no longer issues of domestic concern. Because such issues may explode 
the international system, world leaders and states intervene positively and swiftly to put it 
asunder. This explains the limits of sovereignty in international organizations, 
particularly when states are contracting parties to some conventions on human and 
environmental issues. The defence by the then Nigerian Minister of External Affairs 
(Tom Ikimi) that the world had no business in the happenings in Nigeria and the 
government handling of the Ogoni crisis was, as such, a ruse. Among other diplomatic 
blunders, Tom Ikimi, accused the United States of arrogating to itself the role of global 
policeman of democracy and lampooned the South African President, Nelson Mandela, 
for advocating sanctions against Nigeria in the aftermath of the hanging of Saro-Wiwa 
and eight others. In one of his characteristic unguarded remarks, Ikimi retorted,  
We in Nigeria have held President Nelson Mandela in high esteem. 
Nevertheless, our experience as a people and a nation in world affairs, tells us 
that the successful struggle for liberation does not automatically endow a 
newcomer to the international arena with all the miances to perform 
creditably. And also, whoever gave the South African the song sheet to read 
has not done him honour (Fawole, 2004).  
 
This was coming on the heels of Abacha’s uncomplimentary remark on Mandela when he 
said: “I don’t blame Mandela because, having spent 27 years in detention, he has lost 
touch with the socio-political trend in the world”(The News, 1995). Instead of tactful 
diplomatic fence-mending with Nigeria’s traditional friends and allies in the 
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Commonwealth, an unguided propaganda was mounted to launder the regime’s soiled 
image and condemn perceived and imagined enemies. This did not do much good as the 
regime was unable to regain the confidence and support of the international community 
(Fawole, 2004). The two-year suspension by the Commonwealth was not reversed in 
spite of all entreaties by the junta, leading a frustrated Ikimi to decry the Commonwealth 
as “not a serious Organization. They have done nothing for Nigeria. They have only 
come out with declarations or statements which they cannot carry out.” (Fawole, 2004). 
 
As earlier noted, it was on the account of Nigeria’s violation of the Harare Declaration on 
Human Rights in 1991, to which Nigeria was a contracting party that compelled the 
Commonwealth to suspend Nigeria in 1995. The 1991 Harare Commonwealth 
Declarations also included the resolve of member-states of the organization to promote 
democracy and good governance. Also, as a member of the UN, Nigeria was aware of 
existing treaties and conventions on fundamental human rights and freedoms to which it 
was bound by being a signatory. These include the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (December 10, 1948) which is a general but yet comprehensive document dealing 
with Human Rights and whose provisions were breached in the Ogoni case. Articles 5 
and 9 specifically provide for safeguards against subjecting human beings “to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and against “arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile” (UNDR, 1948). 
 
Perhaps the Ogoni issue might not have elicited much passion and concern if not for the 
fact that the problem of environmental pollution and degradation had become a global 
concern. The world had come to terms with the fact that the environment was the 
common heritage of mankind and that environmental degradation in any country could 
not be overlooked because it carried trans-bounder harm across nations. The focus on the 
environment thus brought the global searchlight on the activities of multinational oil 
corporations, whose relentless drive for oil exploration and the attendant unscrupulous 
drive for profit often culminated in environment abuse and unconcern for their host 
communities, especially in the developing countries. In the Niger Delta, the ruthless 
activities of the Royal Dutch Shell oil company had to come into sharp focus because it 
was the main culprit in Ogoniland (Okerenta, 2006). 
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Rather than take the necessary measures to assuage the wounded feelings of the Ogoni 
people, the Abacha regime embarked on a ruthless military pacification by establishing 
and deploying the notorious Rivers State Internal Security Task Force in Ogoniland. The 
regime took steps that further made it lose credibility in the international system. For 
instance, it set up in November 1995 a 50-man National Committee of Traditional Rulers 
and Leaders of Thought, to advise it on sensitive diplomatic problem. Made up of 
traditional rulers, old politicians from the First and Second Republics and other 
apologists of the regime, it was headed by General Jeremiah Useni, Abacha’s personal 
friend. The ad hoc body did more damage than good because its real purpose was to 
shore up the junta’s sagging legitimacy, organizing huge rallies in all the state capitals 
and Abuja where rented crowds on television, were impelled to openly condemn the 
Commonwealth and other international organizations.                  
 
The recourse to state propaganda as well as violence to crush internal rebellion was 
considered uncivilized by the international community, and had, in the past, even been 
instrumental in the interventions in Cambodia, Panama, Uganda, South Africa during 
apartheid and more recently Iraq. The global community condemned the regime and 
called for sanctions against it. The timing of the execution of the Ogoni Nine which 
coincided with the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand in 1995, was 
embarrassing to a global community that had pleaded for clemency so much and had 
been assured even by Ikimi at the Summit that the Abacha regime was redressing the 
issue. Nelson Mandela had even staked his personal integrity to persuade the Summit not 
to take a hard-line action against Nigeria, having been assured by General Abacha that all 
would end well (Fawole, 2004). 
 
It was even more ridiculous that just when Ikimi had finished addressing the Summit and 
granted interview to the world press that the Nigerian government was not and had not 
hanged the Ogoni leaders, he was confounded when news reached him that they had been 
hanged. Unable to secure any concession to ease its international isolation, the regime, 
using Ikimi, other sycophants, including former members of the June 12 winning team, 
and high profile emissaries, embarked on the search for new allies in and out of Africa. In 
Africa, fellow dictators and states isolated in the international system like Nigeria gave 
their endorsement to the regime. However, with the European Union countries 
maintaining their sanctions and the Commonwealth unrelenting in its criticism, and with 
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the breaking of diplomatic relations with Canada, the international isolation became 
compounded ( Fawole,  2004). 
 
Further, the UN Commission on Human Rights at its 52nd session in Geneva in April 
1996 condemned the regime for continued violation of human rights; the Commonwealth 
through its Commonwealth Ministerial Action Committee proposed the freezing of the 
personal assets of Nigerian rulers, imposition of a comprehensive ban on sporting 
activities, severance of air ties unless the regime took urgent measures towards speedy 
restoration of democratic rule and showed respect for human rights. The report of the 
Fact-Finding Mission of the UN Secretary General to Nigeria also severely indicted the 
regime for gross violation of Human Rights and the rule of law and recommended a 
quick return to democracy, among other things (Fawole, 1999). 
 
The Abacha regime, in short, simply sacrificed Nigeria’s age-long hard-earned 
international respect and goodwill on the altar of incompetence and inordinate ambition 
to crush all local and external challenges in his quest to consolidate his powers. He might 
have wanted to arrest a repeat of the 1994 Rwanda ethnic violence and genocide, which 
came after and soon occurred side by side with the Niger Delta communal skirmishes in 
1993-1994 which probably explains his highhandedness in Ogoniland; but the acts earned 
his regime and Nigeria a place in the pantheons of infamy.   
 
5.0 The Economics of the Niger Delta Conflicts 
The cost of the Niger Delta struggle/conflicts in economic terms may never really be 
adequately estimated. Every party in the conflicts (the oil MNCs, the Nigerian state, the 
people of the Niger Delta, and of course, the international community) appears to be 
mostly concerned with immediate benefits to interests represented. However, the overall 
adverse consequence of the situation is rarely considered by any. The people who have 
been in the struggle over the claim to a decent living as well as a decent environment 
have been abused, oppressed, and suppressed by the elite using the instrument of the 
state. The reason for this is quite obvious; the people are of little or no economic 
relevance to the government. This is because the government needs not depend on them 
for raising any significant revenue needed to run the state. The state thus over the years 
has misplaced its primary responsibility of protecting lives and property to that of 
protecting the multinationals at the very expense of the people it is meant to govern. The 
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masses of the Niger Delta people have gradually become an undesirable “liability” to the 
government instead of an asset. The people have in turn made the region much more 
expensive to govern and to do business trough the activities of militant groups in the area. 
This in any case, is completely avoidable in the first instance.   
 
The Multinationals who seek more profits at the expense of the region have over the 
years opted for the cheaper but immoral and criminal alternative of flaring and venting 
gas and have in the process messed up the environment and wasted so much resources 
even in the midst of hunger in the faces of so many around them. As earlier stated, it is on 
record that a financial lost to Nigeria of about US $2.5 billion annually is traceable to gas 
flaring. Besides, the associated loss of lives and failing health can never be sufficiently 
evaluated. The international community at large is also paying heavily as these MNCs 
contribute their unsolicited fair share of toxic emissions to the environment thereby 
increasing the problem of global warming and rising sea level all over. Moreover, every 
disruption in the supply of crude from the Niger Delta has consistently had its adverse 
impact on the world prices of crude oil. What this means is that everybody all over has 
had to pay more for petroleum products. The international community has not done 
enough to stem the ugly tide. For example, the World Bank has been widely criticized 
over its inability to require the use of AG before approving its credit guarantees for the 
financing of the West African Gas Pipeline Project. Yet, the bank has since November 
2004, approved US$125 million in guarantees supporting the construction of a 678 km 
gas pipeline to transport natural gas from Nigeria to Benin, Ghana and Togo - the West 
African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
This study has been able to review environmental issues central in the Niger Delta crisis. 
It relocated the issues and subsequent conflicts within the uncommon perspective of the 
effective impact of domestic policies on foreign policies or external relations of a state. 
More importantly, the study has looked at the different costs of the emergent militant 
nationalism in the delta on national development and international relations of Nigeria. 
The study also discovered the fact that the successive regimes in Nigeria considered the 
oil TNCs with which they had personal businesses, paramount in Nigeria’ national 
interest ranking, and that probably explains the disposition of their foreign policies to 
protecting their business interests and securing their stakes in the Niger Delta. 
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The Abacha approach seemed to have reared its ugly head again in the President 
Obasanjo era. The continued neglect of the Delta areas despite increased exploration 
activities of many new foreign oil companies, a development prodded by an aggressive 
campaign by the Obasanjo administration for foreign investment, exacerbated the Delta 
crisis. Several other militia movements has emerged in reaction to the government over-
protection of the exploitative oil companies, growing impoverishment, emergence of 
more slum settlements, and above all, increased environmental degradation. The NDPVF 
under Alhaji Asari Dokubo, among others in the struggle, has been abducting expatriates, 
holding MNCs and their home government to ransom and sometimes asking for ransom 
fee and have been asking the same old question namely, good living for Deltans, social 
responsibility on the part of the oil companies and government’s attention by way of  
physical and economic development, meaningful allocation from the huge revenues 
coming from the oil-producing areas, as well as the control of activities capable of 
destroying the eco-system in the Delta region. It is hoped that the Yaradua-Jonathan 
initiative to dialogue with all stake holders and deploy resources to the Delta for social 
rehabilitation and structural development would be faithfully implemented and yield 
some dividends. 
 
It is pertinent he oil companies need to be more perceptive of the plight of the people and 
be more socially responsible by contributing to their welfare, provide jobs for them, 
construct good roads, build decent low-cost housing for them, increase academic 
scholarship awards to their children, build schools and hospitals, provide water and 
electricity to the communities, etc. Put differently, the problem would be lessened when 
oil companies get more committed to their agreement with the government and the host 
communities of ensuring that they carry out their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
to their host communities and avoid indulging in unethical activities. 
 
 
Talking about Corporate Social Responsibility, companies and government should pay 
much attention to the problem of infrastructure (including: roads, bridges, schools, 
hospitals, drinkable water, electricity, etc) in the Niger Delta , which is long overdue for 
national emergency. There is the need for both the governments at the various levels and 
the multinational oil companies to invest massively in infrastructure in this region just as 
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it has been done in Lagos and Abuja. This will ensure that the environment is tidied up, 
made much more comfortable to live in, and the economically idle but restive youths in 
the area are engaged in the mean time and of course provided some profitable means of 
livelihood. Further, the youth can be more profitably engaged if they are encouraged to 
go school. This can be engendered by a policy of provision of scholarships (compulsory 
and free and qualitative education up to tertiary level) to the children from this area so as 
to empower them economically and make them much more useful to the state in the 
future. 
 
Moreover, the question of who controls the natural resources located in a given region 
can be answered by the convocation of a national conference whose recommendations 
should first be subjected to a referendum.  This will allow for a consensus by all 
stakeholders and a more enduring arrangement for the smooth operation of the oil 
industry which is urgently needed for the stability of the world market and the Nigerian 
economy. On the political frontier, there is the need to shift presidential power to the 
region so as to complete the cycle among all the geo-political regions in the country. This 
will allow for equity in the polity, give the people a sense of belonging, and douse some 
tension that is already mounting. This expectation has been partially satisfied now since 
the incumbent Vice President of the country is from the region. However, it must be 
emphasized here that nothing short of the position of the President of Nigeria will 
adequately pacify the Niger Delta people in their quest for a taste of political office in the 
country. 
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